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Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Caron: At the very tactical level, at the combat team level, it’s often about getting close with the enemy and ensuring its destruction.

Lieutenant Adam Orton: Hi, this is Lieutenant Adam Orton with the Canadian Army Podcast. And, today, we are going to talk with Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Caron who’s the outgoing Commander of the Tactics School in Gagetown. And we’re going to be talking about the Combat Team Commander’s Course. Good day, sir.

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LCol Caron: Good day, Adam. How are you doing?

Lt Orton: I’m doing great; how are you?

LCol Caron : I’m doing great, thank you. And, thank you for having me here on this podcast today.

Lt Orton: Yeah. It’s going to be good; I’m looking forward to our conversation. So, before we get into details of the course, can you kind of tell us a little bit about what a Combat Team Commander does, or what a Combat Team Commander is?

LCol Caron: Well, I think we need to focus on the combat team first. The combat team is a grouping of various arms, put together, to deliver a synchronized or a simultaneous effect on the enemy. It implies having several arms—such as the Infantry, the Armour Corps, the Artillery, the Engineers, and perhaps Aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy. This effect is achieved by applying the combat power of these cohesive teams, focus on one goal, which achieves a greater effect than if we were to operate using these various arms separately, or in sequence.

In short, a combat arms team makes good use of assigned combat power to solve a specific tactical problem set. An example known by all, I suspect, is the hasty attack where we see the use of maneuver on the ground—on the battlefield, to bring direct fire, tactical and direct fire, onto a defined enemy position to physically destroy that enemy.

Lt Orton: I find it interesting also that you use the word ‘effect’ because I think a lot of people outside of the military don’t always realize that there’s other effects that one can impose on an opponent other than destroying them. There’s a lot of different things you can do with your combat power other than just destroying the enemy.

LCol Caron: Yes, you’re correct. You could suppress the enemy, as an example. You could fix them while you’re trying to maneuver around them to achieve another objective. But, for the tactical, at the very tactical level, at the combat team level, it’s often about getting close with the enemy and ensuring its destruction. Very often.

Lt Orton: Yeah, the Infantry loves hearing that too.

LCol Caron: Yeah, they do; same with the Armoured Corps.

Lt Orton: So, how does one become a Combat Team Commander?

LCol Caron: Well, that is a complex question. Because a Combat Team Commander does not exist on its own, right? It starts with a Sub-Unit Commander. So, the Combat Team Commander, first of all, needs to be an Infantry, an Armour, an Engineer, or an Artillery Officer that has been selected to attend the Combat Team Commander’s Course. To be selected to attend the Combat Team Commander’s Course, they must have been selected to command a sub-unit, a battery, a squadron, or a company, in the near future. That said, while the officers of the Artillery Corps or Engineer Corps can attend the Combat Team Course—because it provides them with an excellent learning experience, it allows them to know how to best support a combat team, which is another grouping, when needed—these officers, artillery, and engineer officers will never command a combat team. Why? Simply, the definition of a combat team states that it is a temporary task tailored, ad hoc combat arms grouping of a maneuver sub-unit with integral or attached rifle platoons or tank troops. It de facto implies that you have to be an Armour or an Infantry Officer to be able to command a combat team. So, as I stated though, the first step is they need to be selected to command a sub-unit. So, it’s a senior captain on the cusp of promotion or a young major who has been selected to command, in the near future, a sub-unit such as a battery, a company, or squadron. But, to be a combat team commander, as I said, you must be Infantry, you must be Armoured, and you must have the chance to deploy or train within a battle group—so, an armoured unit, or an infantry battalion. And, you must have the chance to be allocated, and assigned the resources of a combat team, to be a Combat Team Commander. Simple answers.

Lt Orton: Well, it’s funny. That makes me think of, you know, when I was a private in Afghanistan. It was exactly that; our Company Commander commanded the resources of the armoured and the armoured assets attached to us, as well as, used the Artillery and things like that. So, I’m fairly confident that Company Commander was the Combat Team Commander because he was orchestrating the whole event. But, that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s going to be Infantry all the time.

LCol Caron: Correct. As I alluded to, by definition, it will either be an Infantry, or an Armoured Combat Team—and, it must be based on an Infantry company, or an Armoured squadron, with attached resources from the other arms, to be a combat team.

Lt Orton: And, so, the other combat arms that also participate in this training, I’m guessing, for them, it’s to understand how all of these elements integrate and operate together anyways. Because, as people in those positions, they have to have a good understanding of how that works.

LCol Caron: Correct. Again, a battery commander or an engineering squadron commander will unlikely work at the combat team level. They’re battlegroups, brigade assets, and will be asked to support the combat team, when needed, with tactical indirect fire, or mobility, counter mobility tasks. But, on their own, they will not command a combat team.

Lt Orton: So, how has this course evolved? Like if we look at pure engagements, which are kind of a cold war, even up to the modern day, that’s always been something that’s been a serious concern. Then you look at asymmetrical warfare, Like, the nature of the combat team must have changed over the past couple of decades. How has the course evolved?

LCol Caron: First of all, the nature of the combat team has not necessarily evolved significantly in the last few decades since WWII.

Lt Orton: Okay.

LCol Caron : I would say while war fighting is a complex endeavor, its essence is simple. Right? And it can be distilled into the general following rules: we need to win during the offense, we need to initiate combat on our own terms, we need to gain and maintain initiative, we need to quickly build momentum and win decisively. Right? That has not changed. As such, I believe that the knowledge and skills that we impart on the Combat Team Commander’s Course here at the Tactic School transcends the evolution that you just mentioned.

Lt Orton: Oh, okay.

LCol Caron : I will explain myself. While we continue to adapt to new capabilities and threats, new vehicles, or weapons with added levels of protection on both the friendly and the enemy’s side, new tanks, new anti-armour weapons, with new lethality on both the friendly and the enemy’s side, while we integrate new methods of command and control systems, while we adjust to the mission at hand—such as, stability Ops, COIN operations—what we teach on the Combat Commander’s Course is the basics, it’s the foundational training. Again, war is a human endeavor, and it’s based on human factors. What we teach on this course here is the knowledge and skill, and some experience that will provide the foundations for these young, sub-unit commanders, potentially Combat Team Commanders, to prevail and win on today’s battlefield and tomorrow’s battlefield.

Lt Orton: Well, we all like winning.

LCol Caron : We do; It’s part of every mission statement.

Lt Orton: Yeah exactly. As we’re talking about this, it’s a very officer intensive course. For our listeners that are NCMs/NCOs, why should they care about what we’re talking about right now?

Lt Col Caron : Well, they should care tremendously. And they should be tremendously interested in the Combat Team Commander’s Course because they are an integral part of the combat team. They make those platoons, those troops, those sub-units in the combat team that are needed to deliver the combat power and win over the enemy. Right? They need to understand the language of doctrine, the tactics, the techniques, and the procedures being employed by their commander. They need to understand how the Combined Arms is grouped, put together, and what it does, and how a combat team can be employed. I would argue, also, that they need to understand their role in supporting the combat team into achieving mission success. And, finally, for those of them who might be interested, to transfer, to become an officer, upon selection, they need to understand the training, the knowledge, the skills, and the expectation of a future Sub-Unit Commander, and potentially Combat Team Commander.

Lt Orton: Yeah, of course. And having made the jump myself also, it’s definitely a different mindset than when you’re just operating in an NCO world. You have to focus on different things, and sometimes it’s not easy to make that mental transition.

LCol Caron: I would agree with you in your statement. While we speak the same language—we apply the same tactics, techniques, and procedures—when you become a Sub-Unit Commander, and potentially, a Combat Team Commander, your areas of responsibilities and accountabilities, and the factors that you must consider are many folder greater than the section commander, or the platoon commander.

Lt Orton: So, we’re talking about NCMs and NCOs. And you mentioned before the significant amount of combat power that lies underneath a Combat Team Commander. So during the training, what kind of resources do you have to simulate that environment of having all these different combat arms and people available to you to execute tasks?

LCol Caron : Good question. The Tactics School is very well resourced to deliver one part of the equation. The Tactics School has the human capital—so the instructors, who are experienced and knowledgeable in Combat Team doctrine, and in tactics, techniques, and procedure. The Tactics School has the support staff to allow the delivery of this course. They also have the computer-based training required to prepare these officers for the next step—which is the field training portion of the course. So, as I said, in its simplest form, the first part, Tactics School is very well resourced.

The second part, which is the field exercise, the Tactics School depends on the field force. It depends on the divisions, brigades, and battalions, and regiments out there to form that battle group, with the combat support and combat service support enablers, to be able to deliver that training. On any serial of the Combat Team Commander’s Course—those that I have delivered anyways in 2018-2019—we had upwards of a thousand people deployed in support of that course. We had eighty combat vehicles, nineteen Leopards, and about sixty one LAV III, LAV VI armored fighting vehicles. And, we had about one hundred support vehicles of all denominations. So, we’re putting a battle group of one thousand plus people in the field to support the training of thirty six students. It’s a lot of effort, it’s a lot of resources being put to deliver excellent training and achieve tremendous outputs, which are those young sub-unit commanders, who are professional and ready to take command.

Lt Orton: That’s a lot of moving parts. So, we’ve got all these LAVs and tanks, and personnel out in the field. And, if we look at, you know, all the other training courses—whether it’s PLQ or even Maple Resolve, there’s usually some sort of culminating battle where there’s tanks and things blowing up everywhere and infantry soldiers running around shooting things, airplanes, you name it. Is there a final exercise along those lines? You’re talking about the field portion of the exercise—is there a final exercise like that, that kind of has that dramatic punch to it as you’re going through it?

LCol Caron: Unlike what we used to call Phase IV, the officer in training of the olden days—late 90s, early 2000s—where we had Exercise COMMON GROUND which was this final exercise you’re talking about. The Combat Team Commander’s Course does not have a final exercise. It has a field portion to the course, known in the past as Exercise COMMON GROUND II, for session 2018-2019, and, will be known as Exercise Tactical Gauntlet for session 2020 and on.

While we don’t have this culminating final exercise—final drive exercise, like some of us may remember—the FTX exposes the candidates to live combat simulation, to the best we can offer them, out there, without having a real enemy shooting at them. This exercise, throughout the two weeks of its conduct, provides candidates with the friction of working with a real battlegroup commander, it provides them with the opportunity to work with a unit, a sub-unit, and a combat team that they don’t know. Because, in general, they don’t belong to that supporting unit. It exposes them to weather. And, let me be frank here, 2018 was not unlike Barbarossa in 1941 in terms of weather—rain, snow, sleet, mud—which had a tremendous impact on the vehicle fleet, but also on the students and their ability to deliver the combat power in question. They have to contend with lack of sleep and intense operations.

What this exercise does for them, as well, is it puts them in the hot seat for about forty eight hours: twenty four hours of planning, parallel to the conduct of operation; twenty four hours while there in command. Those twenty four hours in command, while they had plans for a specific task—let’s say enabling Ops where they were to do an Advance to Contact—during those 24 hours, on the ground, with that combat team, they have to react quickly to changes to situations, groupings, tasks and missions assigned by their battle group commander who is defining, creating these combat team problem sets for the candidates to resolve and effect. All in all, while there’s no final exercise, Exercise COMMON GROUND II—soon to be Exercise Tactical Gauntlet—provides them with the most fidèle training opportunity that they can get out there. And, the comments from the students is that they’re very, very well prepared at the end of that course.

Lt Orton: So, we’re talking about this soon to Tactical Gauntlet Exercise. Have you seen any, kind of, outside-the-box thinking in terms of solving problems more creatively then one might expect? To use a pop-culture reference, you know the old Captain Kirk and the Kobayashi Maru, where he reprograms a simulator. I feel like our exercises are a little more robust, and that you can’t cheat the system specifically. But, fundamentally, the idea is thinking outside the box and coming up with creative solutions.

LCol Caron: I appreciate your pop-culture reference. It is a great question. We would all like to think that we are the next Alexander the Great, the next Rommel, perhaps the next Patton even. But, that’s not what the course is about. Honestly, and frankly, I cannot think of any example— and that’s not the fault of the students, it is not the fault of the Tactics School. We have the simulation required to create those scenarios, the Kobayashi Maru example. The unfortunate part is, we have the students for a very short period of time, and time is precious, and we have a lot to teach them. So, because of that, we cannot allow ourselves the extravagancy of having this ultimate scenario where all students, potentially, will fail. That said, I’d like to let you know though, that while we don’t have this ultimate scenario, every student is being challenged constantly on their application of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and their thought process, and their command skills.

Lt Orton: Well, it’s interesting that you say that, because it is true that outside-the-box thinking is important under certain circumstances. But you’ve got to walk before you can run sometimes also. So, coming up with these crazy Alexander the Great-esque schemes is—I’m sure is ideal, but you’ve got to start somewhere before you get there.

LCol Caron: I agree. I mean, it is our mandate. It is our role at the Tactics School to impart this basic knowledge of doctrine, of tactics, techniques, and procedures. And, once you have this basic knowledge, you can then divert. You can then decide to not use these specific doctrinal tactics, and procedures. But, when you do so, you do so based on the situation, the understanding of what you’re doing, and why you’re doing it, and the possible consequences.

Lt Orton: So, sir. Also, COVID-19 comes into play here for the Combat Team Commander’s Course. What changes have been made to the course in order to accommodate this. And will there be a course run this year?

LCol Caron: The course will occur this year. Same time, same place in Gagetown. Same number of candidates. But, like the Army is deploying troops overseas without Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE, we’re going to conduct the Combat Team Commander’s Course without the FTX. To replace the FTX, we came up with different strategies where we increase the time spent in CAX—so the Computer Assisted Exercise, where we actually can do more. Field simulation is great, but the CAX allows us to do things that we can’t do in the field. So yes, while they’re not deprived of sleep, they don’t have to deal with weather, they can be exposed to proper CAS. So, close air support. They can be exposed to close air attack, they can be exposed to proper artillery fires, tactical and strategic. They can be exposed to mines and an actual enemy that can fight back. Right? And feel the effect of that enemy. So, when you’re talking about the Kobayashi Maru scenario, Combat Team Commander’s Course 2020 can offer an experience closer to that than the actual field FTX. But, I don’t want to be quoted here to say it is a better thing. The lack of an FTX is not desirable and is out of the norm; it is only for the COVID measures of 2020. We really want to go back to having an FTX once COVID is no longer as a determining factor as it is today.

Lt Orton: CAXs and TOETs can only carry you so far—but you’re not living the life until you’re tired and miserable. Right?

LCol Caron : That’s it.

Lt Orton: So, you yourself have done this course. What was your experience on it? And, you know, what did you apply from that in the role that you’re just finishing up in right now?

LCol Caron: I did the course back in 2009. It was an excellent course back then. And, what I’ve learned from it, is the doctrine. I’ve learned the techniques, the tactics, and procedures. At the risk of repeating myself, I’ve learned how to best employ the combat power available to me as a Combat Team Commander. How to synchronize their effect to defeat the enemy at the least cost possible to my combat team. Right? What I’ve learned is how to adapt and overcome changing situations. And, I’ve learned how to hone my command and communication skills throughout that course. So, informed by that, informed by experience as an OC, and as a Combat Team Commander, we’ve continually evolved this course to where it is right now, where we offer the best experience possible, the most realistic training possible, to prepare those young, sub-unit commanders, and potential Combat Team Commanders to overcome the challenges of now and the future.

Lt Orton: Well, I think that sums things up quite nicely. Is there anything else you’d like to add before we wrap this up?

LCol Caron : Yeah, if you allow me, Adam. I would like to talk about the fact that it is the Combat Team Commander’s Course and the associated field training exercise is a tremendous experience. It provides those young sub-unit commanders with a great opportunity to prepare for the task that is about to be theirs. They get to do that in a controlled context where they’re allowed to fail, they’re allowed to learn from their failure, before they take command of their actual sub-unit company squadron or battery. I’d like to talk about the fact, also, that it brings significant benefits to the field force. The unit, regiment, battalion, selected to support this course, gets significant functional, experiential training, benefits out of supporting the Combat Team Commander’s Course and its FTX. And, they all benefit—from the battlegroup commander, the lieutenant-colonel, down to the rifle, number 1 out of the LAV VI.

The other thing I would like to talk about is the fact that Canada is leading in preparing its sub-unit commanders. While the Five Eyes countries: UK, US, New Zealand, and Australia, have a sub-unit command course of some sort—some shorter, some longer—none dedicate as much effort and resources to train their sub-unit commander, to train them to fight, live, and win as sub-unit commanders. In my mind, this contributes greatly to our level of proficiency. And, to quote Colonel Oberwarth, it makes us one of the best armies in the world. That’s it, simply.

Lt Orton: One of the best armies in the world. Well, I can’t think of a better way to wrap that up. That was Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Caron, the outgoing Commander for the Tactics School. And, we were talking about the Combat Team Commander’s Course. Thanks so much for joining us, sir.

LCol Caron : Thank you very much, Adam. This was a great chat. And it was a fun opportunity to do. Thank you.

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Lt Orton: Once again, thank you, sir. And, as usual, don’t forget to follow us, subscribe to the podcast, and check out the Canadian Army on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. Stay frosty.

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